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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,
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                    Plaintiff,
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                v.
                                               19-cv-7433 (LAP)
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     ALAN DERSHOWITZ,
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                    Defendant.
                                               Conference
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                                               New York, N.Y.
                                               (via telephone)
10
                                               November 24, 2020
                                               1:30 p.m.
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     Before:
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                          HON. LORETTA A. PRESKA
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                                              District Judge
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                               APPEARANCES
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     COOPER & KIRK, PLLC
          Attorneys for Plaintiff
     BY: CHARLES J. COOPER
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          NICOLE J. MOSS
19
          MICHAEL W. KIRK
20
     LAW OFFICES OF AIDALA & BERTUNA, P.C.
          Attorneys for Defendant
21
     BY: IMRAN H. ANSARI
          ARTHUR L. AIDALA
22
          -and-
      TODD & WELD LLP
23
          Attorneys for Defendant
     BY: HOWARD M. COOPER
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          CHRISTIAN KIELY
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(Via telephone)

THE COURT: In reading your letters, I wasn't quite sure of what the universe of documents was that we're fighting over, and I'm particularly looking at the November 19th letter, document 209, where you're saying -- and I'm looking at the last paragraph -- "That leaves 475 files that contain confidentiality designations, a significant portion of which contain material that matches the definition of "Confidential Information" to which defendant has already agreed." And then it goes on to say "another significant portion have been produced in this action without a confidentiality designation. The remaining documents are the only documents at issue." How many is that? Do we have any clue?

MS. MOSS: Your Honor, this is Nicole Moss for the plaintiffs. I don't think we have a precise number of how many we're talking about. I don't think it's likely to be a very significant number given, I think, the agreement among the parties that anything having to do with financial, medical, or victim identity information is appropriately under a protective order, and given the fact that, again, much of the other documentation, emails that have been reproduced in this matter that may have at one time had a confidentiality designation in the Giuffre v. Maxwell matter, have been reproduced, many of them, in this matter without that designation. So it's some smaller subset.

THE COURT: OK. Thank you.

May I ask Mr. Dershowitz's counsel, what is the issue with saying when you want to use something publicly? I think in counsel's letter, she said that, for example, if you want to use a document at a deposition, you just go ahead and use it, and ask for permission to make it public later on. I'm not sure I understand what use we will make of the document that will not be easily fixed by just saying, do you care about this document or not?

MR. KIELY: Your Honor, this is Christian Kiely for Professor Dershowitz.

I believe, your Honor, that the parties are now in agreement here. There were essentially two aspects to the dispute. The first is what categories of documents are properly designated confidential in this case. And the second is the procedure for de-designating or redesignating documents that were originally produced in the <code>Maxwell</code> case. I don't agree that it imposes some undue burden on the plaintiff to rereview these 475 documents to make redesignations. However, we have agreed that we will follow the procedure which is set forth in plaintiff's letter where we can make a request for a redesignation on an as-needed basis and they will take up that request promptly. The only thing is that we want the definition of "Confidential Information" -- and I believe the parties are in agreement on this -- to be the definition that's

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set forth in the attachments to both parties' letters, which are those four categories of confidential information that

Ms. Moss just listed, which would be personally identifiable information, victim identity information, and medical and financial information. So I believe that this dispute is essentially resolved.

THE COURT: Ms. Moss, is that right?

MS. MOSS: I think that's largely true, with the following caveat: it appears to us from the defendants' response letter and from what Mr. Kiely has just said that he wants to remove any ability that we may have, if there is a category of documents that they bring to our attention, that doesn't fit neatly within the definitions of the proposed protective order -- we of course would want to reserve the right to bring that to the Court's attention. An example I can provide you -- and I don't know that this would ever be a dispute -- but an example I can provide you is, I know that plaintiff's settlement agreement with Jeffrey Epstein was one of the documents that she produced in her document production in the Giuffre v. Maxwell case. That settlement agreement has confidentiality requirements separate and apart from the Giuffre v. Maxwell protective order. And so we would, even if the Giuffre v. Maxwell order is set to one side, would not be at liberty to remove the confidentiality.

Now, they have not asked to us do that, to be clear,

and I don't know that there would be a dispute. But we need to have the ability, if documents come up that there's some reason we believe they need to remain confidential, that we can seek the Court's intervention and guidance if we can't reach an agreement with the defendants.

THE COURT: Mr. Kiely, you don't care about that, do you?

MR. KIELY: Your Honor, not with respect to the specific example that Ms. Moss just gave. The concern here is that there would be a reservation of essentially unlimited discretion for documents not falling into these enumerated categories. The proposed language that we propose actually includes a carve-out for precisely the type of document that Ms. Moss just mentioned because, in that case, Ms. Giuffre could not unilaterally remove the confidentiality designation because there's a contractual confidentiality designation which she owes under that settlement agreement. That's not the kind of thing we're talking about.

THE COURT: OK. But can't these smart lawyers figure out a reservation clause that will work? This is not a big deal. And if, let's just say, if Ms. Giuffre decides she's not going to waive any of it, then we have our remedies for that too. But can't you guys figure this out?

MS. MOSS: Plaintiff certainly believes that that's the appropriate course, your Honor. And that's what we've

suggested.

MR. KIELY: Your Honor, think we can go back to the drawing board one more time and try to come up with some language that adequately satisfies both of our concerns here.

THE COURT: Wonderful.

What else would you like to talk about?

MS. MOSS: Your Honor, while we're on the topic of the protective order -- and I don't know if this remains a dispute or not -- but as I read the language that the defendant has proposed, it would extend to the deposition transcript of the plaintiff from the <code>Maxwell</code> matter. If I'm incorrect about that, then certainly Mr. Kiely can correct me. But that is another area where we do not believe that the parties in this case should be removing confidentiality designations over a deposition transcript that, as we understand it, has been the subject of separate proceedings in the <code>Giuffre v. Maxwell</code> case, and we would not of course want to interfere with any rulings or decisions that you may have made in that case.

THE COURT: I'm not sure how the parties in this case can agree that a deposition transcript that was marked confidential under the <code>Maxwell</code> protective order is no longer confidential. How does that work?

MR. H. COOPER: Well, your Honor, that has -- this is Howard Cooper.

And by the way, he's too polite to tell you, Ms. Moss,

that it's Christian "KIGH-lee," not "KEE-lee."

MS. MOSS: I apologize.

MR. H. COOPER: That's no problem at all.

But obviously, your Honor, that starts bleeding into issues with regard to the overall situation that's given rise to the disqualification motion that we've filed. So there's no simple answer to that question, unfortunately. We do recognize the limitations that we're currently all operating under.

THE COURT: I didn't understand one word of that answer. It would seem to me that deposition transcripts that are marked confidential in <code>Maxwell</code> are subject to the interminable unsealing process in <code>Maxwell</code> and you people have no say over it. Is that wrong?

MR. H. COOPER: Correct.

THE COURT: Am I wrong on that?

MR. H. COOPER: No. There's no disagreement from Professor Dershowitz's side.

MR. C. COOPER: Nor from the plaintiff's side. Nicki?

MS. MOSS: That is correct. But there is wording in

the defendant's proposed protective order that if the plaintiff

were to reproduce her transcript, as we have done under this

Court's order in this matter, that somehow we would, we the

plaintiff, would have the ability to lift that confidentiality

designation. We do not believe that that is in fact the case.

THE COURT: I know you can draft around this.

MR. H. COOPER: Well, with regard to the plaintiff's own testimony, of course we believe she can lift confidentiality. But my prior answer, your Honor, really just reflected the situation that Professor Dershowitz finds himself in, which I know is a topic for another day. Your Honor has ordered the production of certain things from the Maxwell case, but we of course understand the Court's continued process. And nothing in this order is meant to suggest that we're trying to go around it.

THE COURT: All right, then. It sounds like, if we're not in agreement now, we can draft around so that we are in agreement. Yes?

MS. MOSS: Yes.

MR. KIELY: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: What else?

MS. MOSS: Your Honor, from plaintiff's perspective, I don't know that there is anything else that we view as necessarily ripe. I mean, we certainly have concerns about discovery, but it would be our expectation that we would attempt to continue working those out with defense counsel and bring them to you when they are ripe. I'm happy to discuss those if you want, but there's nothing that I think necessarily requires a ruling from you at this point.

THE COURT: Mr. Kiely, do you have anything else on your agenda today?

MR. KIELY: Well, your Honor, I do think that we want -- I'm not sure exactly -- I know that the Court called this status conference for an update on the status it of discovery. If the Court wants to have a conversation about the scheduling of discovery we're certainly prepared to discuss that, but otherwise we could defer that to another day. I do agree with Ms. Moss that the particular disputes that we

THE COURT: Right. I guess the real question is, how long is this going to take? Going into it, I would not have thought we would still be worried about our documents at this stage. And yet it seems that we have a lot of unreviewed documents. When is that going to be concluded?

previewed in our joint letter to the Court are not ripe at this

point for the Court's consideration.

MR. KIELY: Well, your Honor, I can speak to that. I mean, we have undertaken really, in terms of private-party litigation between individuals, what is a really massive email review based upon an agreed set of search terms, and that relates to Professor Dershowitz's Gmail account, and there is a process in place relating to the Harvard account that, again, I don't think is ripe for your Honor's consider at this time. But we're talking about tens of thousands of emails. The final agreed-upon set after much deliberation for the Gmail account was something on the order of 50,000 emails. And they require a careful review for not only responsiveness but privilege,

particularly where Professor Dershowitz is a practicing attorney and lots of the nonresponsive information is privileged vis-a-vis other clients of his having nothing to do with this case, and we have made a very diligent effort and made our way through a good percentage of those documents, but there are a number that remain outstanding. And plaintiff is seeking to have us do a similarly broad review of Professor Dershowitz's Harvard email account. And that frankly takes time.

THE COURT: It doesn't sound like the last is in process yet.

MR. KIELY: Well, yes, your Honor. It is in process. Defense counsel had attempted to negotiate a voluntary collection process with Harvard University that started in August once the parties had agreed on search terms. For various reasons that I won't get into, that process stalled and about a month later plaintiff issued her own subpoena to Harvard. And since then the parties have been conferring with Harvard in a way to move this forward that works for all parties and protects the parties' various interests, including the attorney-client privilege, which Professor Dershowitz holds not only with respect to his counsel in this matter and related matters but also vis-a-vis other clients of his.

THE COURT: OK. When is the answer? You're telling me you're in process. I don't want to be sitting here at the

end of the first quarter saying, why have you not finished your document discovery.

MR. KIELY: Well, your Honor, that depends in part largely on the volume of email that we end up, from Harvard, that we end up having to go through.

Now, again, I don't think this is quite ripe for your Honor's consideration, but Harvard has its own review that it needs to do to, under FERPA and for its own confidential information, before it even releases any of these documents to either of the parties, whether it be to Professor Dershowitz for a privilege review or to the plaintiff.

And that process needs to occur before the parties even get their hands on the documents. So I think that that process is going to take at least several months.

THE COURT: It sounds to me like that process hasn't even commenced.

MS. MOSS: That's correct, your Honor. It should not be surprising, your Honor, that from the plaintiff's perspective this has been woefully lacking. The defendant knew from the minute this lawsuit was filed back in April of 2019 that he was going to need to produce email from his Harvard email account. And he knew from his prior experience in the Edwards v. Dershowitz matter, in which it took several months to negotiate a protocol with Harvard, that that was going to be necessitated.

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Now, I'm not suggesting that he needed to collect his email before document requests were served on him, which we did in February of this year, but he didn't even begin those discussions with Harvard. And all we have been hearing since we served those discovery requests is that it's in process. Then it was that we needed to have search terms. And then the excuse was, well, we're not doing anything because you, the plaintiff, served a subpoena on Harvard.

What I can tell you is, within weeks of the return date for that subpoena, Harvard had extracted the email, they had provided us information on the volume of email. proposed search terms on that email. And we were able to get that ball rolling with Harvard fairly quickly and are committed to in good faith continue to work to narrow those search terms and date filters to get the volume down to something that would approximate a reasonable review. But the ball is really in the defendant's court. These are his emails. He needs to work a process out with Harvard for how they're going to conduct that FERPA review and how it's going to be paid for. And that is between him and Harvard. All we can do is try to give input regarding the search terms and date filters to make the review reasonable, which we have done and we are continuing to be in the process of doing.

MR. KIELY: Your Honor, the suggestion that we've not been diligent here is not correct. We did not have an

agreed-upon set of search terms. And by the way, by "agreed upon" I mean preliminary, a preliminary sense of what kind of volume we're talking about before we can even begin to have a conversation as to the burden involved, the burden on us and the burden on Harvard. That set was not agreed upon until August, and we immediately undertook a voluntary collection process from Harvard at that point. They required us to agree to pay for all of their costs before even allowing us to run the search terms to know what kind of volume we're talking about or have any other basic information that we need to make an estimate of those costs and the burden to Professor Dershowitz.

So it's been a challenging process, and we've been diligent throughout it.

THE COURT: Can I ask you one question?

MR. KIELY: Yes.

THE COURT: What's your alternative? You've got to do it one way or the other. Counsel says that Harvard has run the search terms and knows the volume on those search terms. I don't understand what's holding this up.

MR. KIELY: Your Honor, that was last week that we first got that set of search terms, and that returned, I think, 150,000 emails. That is not at all reasonable, in light of — that imposes a massive undue burden, in terms of cost, in terms of time, and it's not at all proportional to the needs of the

case, and particularly in light of the massive production of email we have already made from Professor Dershowitz's Gmail account. And there are indications from that production that the most — there are indications from that production that responsive information contained within the Harvard account was forwarded to the Gmail account and has or will be produced to the plaintiff. We can't do a review of 150,000 emails from Professor Dershowitz's Harvard account.

THE COURT: What are you doing about it? Have you talked to counsel about narrowing the terms or the time?

MR. KIELY: Your Honor, we are having those discussions. As I said, we just got that search term report late last week. We had a call with plaintiff's counsel and Harvard's counsel on Friday. We are working on exchanging proposals to narrow the search terms. Hopefully we can reach agreement. If not, we will provide both of those proposals to Harvard's counsel, who will then run the terms and see what kind of reduction it produces. But it's an iterative process. We're working with a third party. And it takes time.

MR. H. COOPER: I don't think it's fair for Ms. Moss to suggest that there was any sort of willful attempt to delay this process. As Mr. Kiely has suggested, we've been working with plaintiff's counsel. We're working with Harvard's counsel. And we're trying to make this process, with a large, massive volume of documents, as expeditious as possible. So I

don't think it's fair to suggest that Professor Dershowitz was delaying in any sort of way.

THE COURT: OK. But this was not a surprise.

Apparently he's gone through this before in connection with other cases. And what's going to happen now is, you're going to tell me in three weeks that you've finally reached agreement, and then Harvard is going to go on vacation, and then we're going to be at the end of the first quarter.

All right. Am I wrong that this is the largest batch of documents still awaiting review?

MS. MOSS: I believe that's correct, your Honor. We also have not received any text messages or any Twitter Direct Messages or anything like that from the defendants either, but we don't know the volume, and I would suspect that this Harvard email account is the most voluminous.

THE COURT: What's the story with whatever counsel just said?

MR. KIELY: Your Honor, we have not received any text messages from plaintiff either. We have to have a meet-and-confer process about the extent to which there is going to be an exchange of text messages. But essentially, just to give your Honor some background here, we have plaintiff, who has largely relied upon her productions from Maxwell of email that was reviewed and produced in that case, and is now criticizing us for the time it's taking to take on a

much more voluminous review, that's many magnitudes larger, of what she had to do. And we've been work extremely diligently on it for months. Our time records would indicate that. It's a ton of email to slog through.

And it's important to note here that, you know, unlike in some other cases where you can apply privilege terms and then produce anything that's not privileged, Professor Dershowitz is a practicing attorney. The nonresponsive documents contain privileged information vis-a-vis other clients of his, and it requires a careful linear review of, for the Gmail, 50,000, for the Harvard email I expect to negotiate a number that is much lower than that so that the process can be completed more quickly. But it just takes time.

And the burden has not been — the burden here is not symmetrical with regard to discovery of email. And so it's absolutely going to take more time for Professor Dershowitz to complete his productions on a rolling basis, per the parties' agreement, than it is for plaintiff to complete her productions.

THE COURT: All right. How about this? Would you write to me, in -- let me just get a date -- how about you write to me no later than December 22, and tell me where you are and what you're up to, please.

MR. KIELY: Yes, your Honor, certainly.

THE COURT: What else, friends?

MR. H. COOPER: Your Honor, this is Howard Cooper for Professor Dershowitz. I don't want to interrupt if plaintiff's counsel has additional items, but if they're done, there is an item I would like to raise.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. C. COOPER: Before we move to other items, I think, if you will indulge another moment, I think Ms. Moss ought to update on where we are in terms of producing a voluminous amount of text messaging, which is Ms. Giuffre's apparently preferred method of electronic communication, and our expectation that Professor Dershowitz will likewise produce his relevant discoverable text messaging.

Would you please proceed, Ms. Moss.

MS. MOSS: Certainly. And to be clear, your Honor, the document requests for both of the parties included and defined "Documents" to include text messages. We collected the plaintiff's text messages. We have reviewed them. We reviewed them for privilege, reviewed them for confidentiality, and indeed we were poised to be able to do a production, when we inquired about the status of the defendant's text message production and learned that it apparently hasn't even been collected or the process even been put in place. And so we did not make our initial production until it was going to be clear that this was going to be reciprocal, because of course we don't believe that the burden should only be on her or the

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obligation should only be on the plaintiff to produce text messages. It should be a two-way street here. And we've even redacted them for confidentiality so that they could be produced in advance of there being an agreed protective order, redactions that we would likely be able to remove once a protective order is in place.

And we've done that likewise, going to great effort to collect and put her Twitter Direct Messages — which are far more difficult to collect and put in a review process than text messages are. We've done that process as well and produced them.

So we believe that we are very close, with the caveat that we still have confidential information to produce once there's a protective order in place, of being complete with the plaintiff's document production.

THE COURT: OK. Mr. Kiely, it's not your position that texts and tweets are not documents, is it?

MR. KIELY: Your Honor, no, that's not our position. The question would be -- and I was not prepared to address this particular issue today. More homework needs to be done. But the question would be, I know from my experience in other cases that collecting text messages and particularly iMessages is an enormously complex and expensive process, and oftentimes there is no guarantee of success of recovering anything relevant. So we need to understand what would be involved in doing that and

the extent to which Professor Dershowitz even has relevant text messages.

And with regard to tweets, tweets of course are public information. They are equally accessible to plaintiff.

With respect to Direct Messages, we don't -- plaintiff has produced those. We have no objection to producing relevant Direct Messages from Professor Dershowitz's Twitter.

THE COURT: I wasn't sure what you said about texts, please.

MR. KIELY: Well, your Honor, I'm not prepared to address the Court on our final position with respect to the production of Professor Dershowitz's texts. I certainly don't dispute that they fall within the definition of "Documents." The question is, what is involved in collecting them and producing them for use in litigation. I know from prior experience it is a massively complex and expensive process. So we need to understand what that burden would be before we can have a discussion about text messages. And I didn't. So that's our position.

THE COURT: Why have we not made inquiry until now?

MR. KIELY: Your Honor, I would have to go back and look at the formal document requests, but there have not been any follow-up requests from plaintiff for the production of text messages, and we have been focused on making as much email production as we possibly can.

THE COURT: All right. It sounds like you had better look at it. I think I heard Ms. Moss say that these were defined terms.

Ms. Moss, am I wrong, what you said?

MS. MOSS: The definition of "Documents" included texts. Yes.

MR. KIELY: Your Honor, I will have to go back and look at our objections. Parties include all kinds of things within the definition of "Documents" that are not ultimately produced in litigation. So, again, I was not prepared to address this right now.

MR. C. COOPER: Your Honor, we are in a litigation where text messages are not — typically and routinely understood to be within the definition of "electronic documents" and are produced. So I don't know where this dispute is coming from.

MR. H. COOPER: There is no dispute here yet, your Honor. And I think it's fair to say that from Professor Dershowitz's perspective, given the level of time, energy and effort that has gone into responding to plaintiff's requests, which are asymmetrical in part because of the significant spoliation issue on the plaintiff's side, it's surprising that we are getting into this level of detail, when all of this is under discussion. And what I can say from the defendant's perspective is, we are committed to moving this case forward.

You've asked us to file a report by December 22nd. We will do so. We will have a position with regard to text messages and proportionality by then. But in the interim we're hopeful that the multitude of discussions that have taken place to date, trying to work these things out cooperatively, will continue, rather than prematurely placing them in front of you.

THE COURT: All right. The only thing, Mr. Cooper, that I'll check -- I'm sorry -- Mr. Howard Cooper. The only thing that concerned me was hearing that no inquiry had even been made yet with respect to texts and all of that other tweety stuff. That was the concern.

MR. H. COOPER: And, your Honor, if that's what you heard, I understand the Court's concern. I think it's fair to say that we are working diligently on everything, and we are regularly in discussion with plaintiff's counsel, and for anyone in this call to suggest otherwise is without basis in fact. And I think that we ought to direct our efforts prospectively to move this case forward, which is certainly what it sounds like all counsel and all parties are interested in doing.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. C. COOPER: Amen to that.

MR. H. COOPER: In that regard, your Honor, I did have another issue, but I don't want to interrupt plaintiff's counsel if they're still placing things in front of you.

THE COURT: Mr. Charles Cooper, have you finished?

MR. C. COOPER: Your Honor, I know of nothing that's come up that we need to elaborate or add to. Thank you.

THE COURT: OK. Mr. Howard Cooper.

MR. H. COOPER: Thank you, your Honor.

We have been asking for months to take the plaintiff's deposition. I recognize that factors such as an unprecedented pandemic have intervened, so I'm not faulting anybody for the plaintiff's lack of — unavailability. But basically what we've been told to date is that she's not available, she can't travel to the United States. The parties have agreed to two days for each of Ms. Giuffre and Professor Dershowitz, and we would like to get that on the calendar. And to be clear, it's a deposition that we will be videotaping. We would prefer to do it in person, socially distanced, at a mutually acceptable location so that everybody is comfortable, done in accordance with CDC guidelines. We're not asking to do it next week. But this really could not drag on, and we would like some assistance from the Court in getting Ms. Giuffre's deposition on the calendar. Thank you.

THE COURT: Were you going to do it before you have all the documents?

MR. H. COOPER: Your Honor, we would like to get it on the calendar, assuming that it will be at a date after the documents have been produced.

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MR. C. COOPER: Your Honor, may I speak to this issue?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. C. COOPER: Thank you.

We certainly recognize that Ms. Giuffre's deposition will be taken. Two points. First, the same question you ask is the question that we ask, and we believe that neither her deposition nor Professor Dershowitz's deposition should or can reasonably be taken before both sides have completed their document production, number one. And, number two, there have been, sadly, Ms. Giuffre has experienced a number of health-related problems, quite apart from the pandemic, that have presented obstacles, at least thus far, to scheduling a deposition. We can certainly commit to scheduling a deposition pending travel restrictions, and hopefully the vaccine and other prayed-for events that are going to make this pandemic issue, particularly for somebody who lives in Australia, relaxed -- but we're not resisting in the slightest the deposition. It's these other obstacles that I think are going to have to be cleared before either side can really realistically take the depositions of the two parties in this case.

MR. KIELY: May I respond, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. KIELY: This is the first I'm hearing about health issues, and I obviously regret hearing about that and will

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defer to them. I will note that the travel restrictions are difficult to parse. Ms. Giuffre is a United States citizen. We understand that in connection with other matters, since this case has been filed, she has come to the United States a couple times and perhaps had been doing so regularly. We don't think that we need necessarily to, at all, to complete Professor Dershowitz's document production, again recognizing the asymmetry in those productions, in the parties' productions, before going forward with Ms. Giuffre's deposition. She after all is the plaintiff who initiated this case. So what I would ask, as a practical matter, is to hear from plaintiff's counsel when in the next 60 to 90 days we can reserve two days for her to do a deposition. As I said, we would like do it socially distanced, in the same room, large conference room, CDC guidelines to be followed, and obviously everything will be subject to whatever particular needs exist, restrictions exist at the time. We'll all have to be flexible. But given the difficulty we've had and the age of the case, we would like to get her deposition on the books as soon as we reasonably can.

MS. MOSS: Your Honor, if I may — this is Ms. Moss. The pandemic began in March. She has not traveled out of Australia since then and the travel restrictions that have been put in place by the Australian government, which have run the gamut from not allowing travel outside but, as importantly, her concern about being allowed to return to Australia, where her

children, her minor children, live. So even if she could come to the United States for this deposition, she for obvious reasons is quite concerned about whether she would be able to return back to Australia. And realistically, until we have a better sense of what's going to be allowed in terms of this global pandemic, it just — you know, the notion that we have not been agreeing to dates, it has been — we all well know that, since March of 2020, which is just a few short months after we took over representing Ms. Giuffre, this pandemic came into being. And that has been the primary reason that we have not been able to schedule anything. And I don't see that changing any time soon, unfortunately.

MR. C. COOPER: And I would just hasten to add this. We are united with counsel for defendants in the strong preference that the depositions in the case take place in person under proper health-related protocols. And we are committed and will in good faith negotiate with our friends on the other side to make that happen when it can reasonably be done, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you do this. Why don't you write to me no later than January 15 on where you are on your dates. We ought to know a lot more by then, and hopefully you'll have a better sense of what is doable and not doable.

MR. C. COOPER: Very well, your Honor.

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MR. KIELY: Very well, your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
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                          Anything else? Yes, sir.
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               MR. KIELY: The only other item I had hoped to ask the
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      Court about is, your Honor, we will shortly have to the Court
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      the fully briefed disqualification motion. I don't know
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      whether your Honor intends to hear argument on that, but we're
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      hoping to have the opportunity to address it. We think it's an
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      important motion.
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               THE COURT: Yes, sir. We'll take a look.
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               MR. KIELY:
                          Thank you, your Honor.
11
               THE COURT: Anything else, friends?
12
               MR. C. COOPER: Not from the plaintiff's side, Judge
13
     Preska.
14
               MR. H. COOPER: And your Honor, from the defendant's
15
      side, I just wish everybody a happy Thanksgiving and a safe
16
      one.
17
               THE COURT: And you as well. Thank you.
18
               MR. C. COOPER: And the same to you, Howard, as well,
19
      and friends.
20
               COUNSEL:
                        Thank you.
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